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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the meaning and value of citizenship in response to the proposed 
reforms contained in the Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill. In order to evaluate 
the issues raised by the proposed reform, this paper assesses the meaning and value of citizenship 
to the individual. 
The argument is made that citizenship is deserving of human rights status given the 
importance of the rights that flow from citizenship and as well as other fundamental values and 
interests that citizenship status facilitates and protects . This argument is supported by 
developments in international law which point towards the recognition of the right to an effective 
nationality. 
This paper also argues that in order for citizenship to be treated as a human right, it is 
necessary to address the question of who the right applies to. This involves an evaluation of how 
the law should provide for the acquisition and deprivation of citizenship status. Comparisons are 
made to the jurisdictions of a range of countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Israel and Australia. 
At the time of completion of this paper, the Bill was before the Government 
Administration Select Committee and it was unclear as to the final content of the Bill. 
Nevertheless , it is evident that the intention of the Government is to introduce law changes that 
are exclusionary in nature and that this does not bode well for the future of New Zealand. This 
paper suggests that constitutional reform should be undertaken in order to treat citizenship as a 
human right. 
Word Count 14 842 (excluding footnotes , bibliography, contents page :!nd abstract). 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Early this year, the media announced that the Government had circulated 
among Cabinet members draft legislation that would give governments the power 
to deprive a person of his or her New Zealand citizenship on the basis of national 
security concerns. 1 This announcement provided the impetus to this paper: 
should such a change be allowed? 
The objective of this paper is to answer this question by undertaking a 
rights-based assessment of the value and meaning of citizenship to the individual. 
This assessment involves a determination of whether citizenship itself can be 
considered a human right and will form the necessary platform in order to 
critique the proposed law reform. 
Throughout the course of researching and writing this paper, further 
information on the Government's proposed reform to citizenship law became 
available. Indeed, the most significant proposed change was issued by a 
Supplementary Order Paper three weeks from the date that this paper was due for 
completion. Given the uncertainty surrounding the actual content for the law 
reform, this paper has focussed on providing a basis to assess any proposed 
reform to citizenship law. It has done this by addressing the importance of 
citizenship to an individual and asking how this should be reflected in law. 
Nevertheless, this paper does make some observations about the desirability of 
the proposed reform. 
This paper will first provide a definition of citizenship and explain 
traditional assumptions that apply to it. It will then address the current treatment 
of citizenship in law and attempt to explain the lack of attention it receives in 
New Zealand. The next part of the paper will examine whether citizenship can be 
treated as a human right; this forms the rights-based assessment of citizenship. 
The final part of this paper will consider how citizenship should be treated in 
1 "PM defends citizenship review .. (29 March 2004) New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
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New Zealand law. The proposed law reform will be assessed against this 
benchmark and suggestions will be made for constitutional reform. 
This paper will employ a comparative approach by utilising the 
experience of overseas jurisdictions to point to alternative models and highlight 
trends in the treatment of citizenship in law. The selection of jurisdictions has 
been made in order to make useful comparisons, rather than decide which 
jurisdiction's approach is the most appropriate. 
II CITIZENSHIP AND TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
A Definition of Citizenship 
Citizenship has a wide variety of meanings. It can be viewed as a legal 
status, a State of mind, a civic obligation, an immigration benefit, an 
international legal marking and a personal virtue A good starting point is to 
define citizenship as the strongest bond between an individual and his or her 
State.2 This bond has a legal status which some individuals enjoy and which 
some people aspire. 3 Citizenship is a legal relationship, which as Bradley 
l 
. 4 exp ams: 
is founded on the current law of the State, including a constitutional text 
where this exists. Subject to the provisions of any constitution, the 
legislation in force will determine (a) the rules as to who are citizens. and 
(b) the legal rights, privileges and duties of those citizens. Questions as to 
what citizenship entails are questions about the rules of public law in the 
State concerned. 
The legal status aspect of citizenship can be viewed as one level of the 
meaning of citizenship. Karantani has usefully divided citizenship into three 
levels of meaning: 
2 Yaffa Zilbershats The Human Right to Citizenship (Transnational Publishers, Ardsley (New 
York), 2002) xiii. 
3 Peter Schuck 'The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship" ( 1997) 12 Geo Immigr LJ I , 2. 
4 Anthony Bradley "·British Subjects ' and 'Commonwealth Citizens· - an Imperial Experience of 
Trans-national Citizenship?" 6th World Congress of the International Association of 
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1. The nominal aspect of "citizenship-as-status:": a formal membership 
of a political unit. 
11. The substantive aspect of "citizenship-as-rights and "citizenship-as-
desirable-activity": a bundle of rights and obligations assigned to the 
holders of citizenship. 
111. The functional aspect "citizenship-as-social-enclosure": where 
citizenship is the means to include and exclude people. 5 
This paper will discuss citizenship rn relation to all three levels of 
meaning. 
B Nationality 
As a status, citizenship denotes formal membership of a State, but it also 
can imply an individual's national membership of a group of shared identity 
loyal to a State, commonly called nationality. The terms citizenship and 
nationality are interchanged with one another but their shared meanings do not 
completely overlap.6 There are different meanings of nationality need to be 
explained. 
Nationality is a legal concept most commonly used in international law to 
describe membership in a State. Nationality denotes a specific legal relationship 
between an individual and international law. It provides his or her State of 
nationality with the locus standi to protect his or her interest in the international 
arena.7 Therefore, the term nationality can be taken to mean the external effects 
of the State-citizen relationship. 8 This paper will generally use the term 
citizenship in relation to the issues that relate to a State's domestic jurisdiction. 
Constitutional Law <http://iaclworldcongress.org/cnglish/program.shtml > (last accessed 14 July 
2004) pl. 
5 Rieko Karatani Defining British Citi-;.enship: Empire, Commonwealth, and Modern Britain 
(Frank Cass Publishers, London. 2003) 197. 
6 See generally British Nationality Act 1981 which defines citizenship. 
7 Johannes MM Chan "The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right: The Current Trend 
Towards Recognition" ( 1991) 12 Hum Rts L J 1, I. 
8 Bradley, above n 4, I. 
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The term nationality will be used in relation to the discussion on international 
law. 
The second meaning of nationality, is an ethnological term connoting a 
historical relationship with a specific ethnic, linguistic or racial group.9 Often the 
conceptions of nationality and citizenship are indistinguishable in practice, 
particularly in ethnically homogenous States. But that is not always the case as 
exemplified in the United Kingdom. Scots, Welsh and English people comprise 
separate nations, in the sense of ethnic origins, but are within one State. 
Regardless of whether a State is comprised of many nations or is 
homogeneous in its ethnic makeup, the State is able to exert control over who is 
included and excluded in the identity of the State. This point leads to a discussion 
on the principle of sovereignty and its application to citizenship. 
C State Sovereignty 
The definition of citizenship provided by Bradley underlines the 
traditional assumption regarding citizenship, that is, the State has the prerogative 
to decide the identity of its citizens. This is because citizenship is viewed as 
being within the ambit of a State's sovereignty. 10 
The principle of sovereignty is based on the notion that the State has 
power over its own territory to determine the laws that govern those within it. 
This principle was one of the features of the rise of the Nation State and was 
fundamental in the early development of international law. 11 In its classical form, 
the principle of sovereignty describes a world in which "supreme power is 
exercised within a particular territorial unit". 12 
9 Jeffrey Blackman '·State Succession and Statelessness: the Emerging Right to an Effective 
Nationality under International Law" (1998) 19 Mich J Int'I L 1141, 1146. 
10 Zilbershats, above n 2, 8 . 
11 Kim Rubenstein "Citizenship, Sovereignty and Migration: Australia' Exclusive Approach to 
Membership of the Community'' (2002) 13 PLR I 02, l 04. 
12 Rubenstein. above n 11, I 04. 
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The function of nationality under international law, that is the allocation 
of individuals to a specific State, is fundamentally an attribute of State 
sovereignty. The State has absolute control of its borders and its nationals. The 
orthodox view of international law holds that only the State can determine who 
comprises its nationals. 13 
This paper will address the movement away from this orthodox theory 
towards a recognition that international human rights law will affect how a State 
determines citizenship criteria. Before this discussion takes place, it is important 
to assess how citizenship status is at present acquired , and the level of attention it 
receives within New Zealand's legal system. 
III CURRENT MEANINGS 
A Legal Construct 
The law that sets out how citizenship may be acquired or lost may be 
regarded by some countries as being of a constitutional nature. Citizenship law 
may also be simply regarded as a creature of ordinary statute. 
As a corollary to the belief that the confem1ent of citizenship rests on the 
will of the State, many believe that citizenship is simply a legal construct lacking 
in any constitutional meaning. Alexander Bickel declared that "citizenship is a 
legal construct, an abstraction, a theory. No matter what the safeguards, it is at 
best something given, and given to some and not to others, and it can be taken 
away." 1-l Bickel's description of citizenship is apt for New Zealand. 
In New Zealand, citizenship is defined and conferred by the Citizenship 
Act 1977. This Act sets out how New Zealand citizenship is acquired and lost. It 
is not clear as to whether the Citizenship Act has constitutional tatus given the 
lack of a written constitution in New Zealand. According to New Zealand 
constitutional law academic Philip Joseph, certain statutes are considered so 
13 Blackman, above n 9, I 149. 
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important that they have constitutional status. 15 The Citizenship Act has not 
traditionally been part of this list. 
There is limited judicial reflection on the meaning of citizenship to an 
individual by the New Zealand courts. From my research it appears only 
Hammond J in Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs has considered the value of 
citizenship. In an obiter comment, Hammond J declared that citizenship was 
"critically important human right". 16 Earlier in the judgment, Hammond J 
observed that citizenship was once seen as a privilege granted by the State, but 
that the modem conception is that citizenship is a means to an end and 
"conceptually therefore, there has been a shift from a formalist, grant-of-rights 
theory, to a more functional conception of citizenship." 17 This is a rare statement 
from the bench. In most cases the courts have limited their attention to the 
revocation of citizenship for people who have acquired the status through 
dishonest means. 18 
The status of citizenship is also neglected in other areas of law. The Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (hereafter "the Bill of Rights") provides cursory attention to 
citizenship. The language employed in the Bill of Rights to allocate rights 
generally has universal application: "everyone lawfully in New Zealand has the 
right of freedom of movement" or "every person has the right to manifest that 
person's religions or belief'. 19 The entitlement to rights is based on a person 
being located in New Zealand, not on being a citizen. A couple of distinctions are 
made, however. Only citizens have a right to enter and remain in New Zealand 
and the right to vote. 20 
The authors of the White Paper on the Bill of Rights, a discussion paper 
that formed the debate on the purpose and content of the Bill of Rights, did not 
14 Alexander Bickel The Morality of Consent cited in David Schwartz "Citizenship Without 
Consent: Illegal Alien in the American Polity" ( 1986) 74 Cal if L Rev 2143, 2170. 15 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers. 
Wellington , 2001) 21. 
16 (15 August 1997) HC AK 187/97 21. 
17 Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 16, I 0. 
18 See Wang v Minister of Internal Affairs [ 1998] I NZLR 309 (HC). 19 BillofRightsAct 1990,ss l4, 15,and 18 . 
20 Bill of Rights Act 1990, ssl 2 and 18(2). 
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consider citizenship.2' Its meaning and importance was simply not addressed. 
The reason for the omission may lie in the reliance placed on the Canadian 
Charter of Rights22 and Freedoms and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) for the content of the Bill of Rights. 23 
The Canadian Charter does not include a right of an individual to be a 
citizen. It contains similar distinctions to the Bill of Rights with an additional 
protection regarding education minority rights. 24 Article 24(3) of the ICCPR sets 
out a right for children to acquire a nationality but the White Paper did not 
address the inclusion on this Article in the Bill of Rights. The focus of the 
contributors to the White Paper was to ensure access to and protection of 
procedural rights, such as for example, the right of a fair trial, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association.25 This reflects the theory of American legal 
philosopher, John Hart Ely who advocated a process theory of rights protection.26 
These factors explain the omission of citizenship in the Bill of Rights. 
The matter of citizenship receives similar treatment m the United 
Kingdom. The British Nationality Act 1981 defines the entitlement to British 
citizenship. British citizenship has been described as "wholly a creature of 
statute".27 This Act was primarily designed as an immigration control measure 
and, apart from creating the right of abode, does not specify rights and benefits 
that flow from the status of citizenship.28 Other statutes limit the rights of non-
citizens where this is considered to be appropriate. 
Unlike New Zealand and the United Kingdom, Australia has a written 
constitution. The word "citizenship" (or "citizen") was deliberately excluded 
from the Australian Constitution given the perceived difficulties its inclusion 
21 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985). 22 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada Act 
1982 (UK), sch B ). 
23 International Covenant on Ci vii and Political Rights ( 19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 24 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, above n 22, Art 23( I). 25 White Paper, above n 21, 28. 
26 John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University 
Press , Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1980). 
27 Karatani. above n 5 , 185. 
28 Karatani, above n 5. 1. 
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?9 . would create. - It was generally felt by the participants m the constitutional 
convention debates of the late nineteenth century that not only was the term 
difficult to define, but that it introduced issues that the participants felt ill 
equipped to address. The complex questions of double citizenship (Federal/State) 
and the need to determine who should be excluded and included in the new 
Australian nation remained unresolved. 30 Later, in 1948, Australia enacted 
citizenship law, which set out qualifications for citizenship and naturalisation 
processes. 31 
The consensus among Australian academics is that citizenship is simply a 
legal construct Jacking any constitutional status.32 Rubenstein comments that 
"citizenship is a legal status which has had a slow, staggered and disconnected 
evolution which needs urgent review."33 
Like the situation in New Zealand, the Australian and British courts have 
not addressed the meaning of citizenship. Rubenstein is of the view that the lack 
of reference to the term "citizen" in the Australian Constitution has been a 
constraining factor in the Australian court's approach to citizenship.34 In these 
three countries, citizenship law is not regarded as possessing apparent 
constitutional status. 
B Constitutional Status 
The approaches of New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom by 
no means represent the common approach to citizenship across the world. Two 
useful comparisons can be drawn with Israel and the United States. 
29 Kim Rubenstein "Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal 
Inference··(] 997) 25 FL Rev 295,297. 
30 "Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal Inference'' , above n 29, 
296. 
31 Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth). 
32 Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal Inference··, above n 29, 
297; see also Greg Taylor "Citizenship Rights and the Australian Constitution" (200 I) 12(3) PLR 
205, 208-213. 
33 Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates: A Mere Legal Inference", above n 29, 
317. 
34 Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citi-;,enship Law in Context (Law Books Co, Pyrmont (NSW) 
2002) 257. 
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In Israel, the Nationality Law 1952 sets out the requirement for 
citizenship status. The main means of acquiring Israeli citizenship is through a 
connection to the Jewish faith and the Law of Retum.35 Citizenship status is 
regarded as a "basic right" by the courts despite the lack of a written constitution. 
This indicates that citizenship is regarded in Israeli law as possessing 
constitutional status. 36 Gross, an Israeli academic and ex-military Judge, explains 
that the Israeli High Court in Hila Alroi v Minister for the Interior accepted that 
"the right to citizenship is a basic right, inter alia, because it is the basis for the 
right to vote for the Knesset from which democracy flourishes. 37 Despite 
citizenship being considered a basic right in Israel, Israeli law provides for the 
deprivation of citizenship, as this paper will discuss later. 
In the United States, citizenship is defined and conferred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution:38 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
The Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause served to reverse the 
Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott, which held that persons of African 
descent did not and could not possess citizenship.39 According to Bosniak, most 
commentators read the Amendment as defining the criteria for citizenship in 
general terms as it "tells us who are citizens of the United States".40 The 
Amendment does not apply to the naturalisation process; immigration law and 
policy regulate the process of determining who can become a United States 
citizen. 
35 Zilbershats, above n 2, 77. 
36 Emanuel Gross "Defensive Democracy: Is it Possible to Revoke the Citizenship. Deport, or 
Negate the Civil Rights of a Person Instigating Terrorist Action against his Own State?'' (2003) 
72 UMKC L Rev 51 , 64. 
37 Gross, above n 36, 63 . 
38 United States Constitution, amendment XIV § 1. 
39 Dred Scott, , Sangford ( 1857) 60 United States ( 19 How) 393 cited in Linda Bosniak 
··constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage" (2002) 62 Ohio St. LJ 1285, 1295. 
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The Supreme Court in Afroyim v Rusk interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to mean that citizenship is a constitutional right: 41 
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, 
protect every citizen of this Nation against congressional forcible 
destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, colour or race. Our 
holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a 
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he 
voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship. 
As the above discussion has illustrated, the approach of United States and 
Israel to citizenship is in stark contrast to that of New Zealand. The next section 
of this paper attempts to explain why citizenship has suffered from a lack of 
attention in New Zealand. 
C The Attention Deficit 
The Australian expenence has shown that the presence or lack of a 
written constitution is not the key factor that determines the constitutional status 
of citizenship law. History also plays a large role in explaining the lack of 
constitutional status of citizenship in New Zealand. 
The United States fought a war of independence against the British and 
set about defining a new nation. Early debates took place over who should be 
considered citizens, for instance in the early 1800s a debate took place over 
whether or not native Indians should be accorded citizenship status.42 The 
Fourteenth Amendment was a direct result of the American experience of slavery 
and the Amendment sought to ensure that African-Americans were afforded the 
same legal status as white Americans. Similarly, the State of Israel has fought 
many wars for its survival as a State. Citizenship laws have played a major role 
40 Bosniak, above n X, 1296. 
41 
( 1967) 387 US 253, 268 (SC). 
42 Earl Maltz·· Citizenship and the Constitution: a History and Critique of the Supreme Court's 
Jurisprudence" ( 1996) 28 Ariz St LJ 1135, 1142. 
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in allowing people of Jewish faith across the world to "return" to their ancient 
homeland.43 
New Zealand was created under arguably less exigent circumstances. Our 
history has not required an examination of citizenship criteria and its meaning. 
From New Zealand ' s inception as a colony, the acquisition of citizenship status 
was never an issue: Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi , the Crown guaranteed 
Maori the "same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England". This 
is an explicit statement of Maori being able to enjoy the same status of British 
subjects.44 New Zealand has had the good fortune of being a stable democracy, 
an island State with no border disputes with its neighbours and having a 
population not tom apart by centuries-old ethnic feuds. 
Perhaps as a result of history and the assumption that the State has the 
exclusive right to determine who are its citizens, citizenship (at least as far as my 
research has proven) has not featured as a topic of debate in New Zealand. There 
has also been very limited attention from New Zealand academics to the study of 
citizenship, particularly in terms of the meaning and value of citizenship and how 
this is articulated in law. Debates regularly take place regarding immigration but 
these are focussed on who are to be included as future New Zealand citizens and 
not the wider issues of citizenship. 
The Government has recently introduced the Identity (Citizenship and 
Travel Documents) Bill , a major law reform of the law relating to citizenship 
law.45 Based on my monitoring of the news media, the amount of debate 
generated by the proposed reform appears to be very limited. This is unfortunate. 
The following pait of this paper will demonstrate that citizenship is of great 
importance to an individual and any changes to the attainment of citizenship 
status or the ability of the Government to deprive an individual of his or her 
citizenship should be carefully scrutinised. 
43 Gross, above n 36. 63. 
44 Claudia Orange Treaty of Waita11gi (Allen and Un win , Wellington 1987) 42. 
45 Idcntity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill, No 148-1 . 
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IV CITIZENSHIP AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
A Rights-Based Approach 
A rights-based approach is an argument showing that an individual's 
interest is considered in itself to be sufficiently important from a moral point of 
view to justify holding people to be under a duty to promote it.46 This approach is 
valuable to the consideration of the law reform proposals on citizenship. It 
provides a conceptual framework to analyse the proposed law reform as it directs 
an inquiry into the meaning and value of citizenship to an individual and how the 
law should reflect this. If citizenship is considered to be of such importance to an 
individual that it should be accorded a human rights status, this will directly lead 
to examination of how citizenship is treated in law: on what terms citizenship 
status is granted to an individual and when it can be revoked by the State? Does 
the State have any obligations, or is citizenship status simply bestowed out of the 
State's generosity? 
Bickel would declare a rights-based approach to citizenship as 
dangerous: 47 
Emphasis on citizenship as the tie that binds the individual to government 
and as the source of his rights leads to metaphysical thinking about 
politics and law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking, to a 
search for reciprocity and symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights 
and ob ligations. rationally ranged from one next to the other. Such 
thinking bodes ill for the endurance of free , flexible , responsive. and 
stable institutions and of a balance between order and liberty. It is by such 
thinking, as in Rousseau 's The Social Contract, that the claims of liberty 
may be readily translated into the postulates of oppression. I find it 
gratifying, therefore, that we live under a Constitution [the United States·] 
to which the concept of citizenship matters very little, that prescribes the 
decencies and wise modalities of government quite without regard to the 
concept of citizenship. 
46 Jeremy Waldron The Right to Private Property (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988) 3. 47 Alexander Bickel The Morality of Consent cited in Schwartz, above n 14, 2170. 
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Bickel makes an important point. By treating citizenship as a right, 
thereby promoting its importance and use to allocate rights and benefits, the 
universal trend of rights allocation is weakened. Thus citizenship could be used 
to effect discrimination. This point is addressed further below.48 
According to Jeremy Waldron, rights are "individualistic 
considerations".49 The language of rights is reserved by rights-theorists for 
"interests and considerations that they take to have special importance, an 
importance which would warrant overriding other values and ideals whenever 
they conflict with the protection of rights."50 
Ronald Dworkin explained the special force of rights by drawing an 
analogy with a trump card:51 
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have 
rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient 
justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or 
to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury 
upon them. 
Thus, the "nerve of a claim of a right" is an individual 's entitlement to protection 
against the majority even at the cost of the general interest.52 
Citizenship can be considered a legal right. It is articulated in law as an 
entitlement and it therefore comprises a valid claim.53 Anyone who qualified for 
New Zealand citizenship but was denied this status could bring a claim under the 
Citizenship Act 1977 for a court to consider. However, a legal right can always 
be taken away by ordinary legal processes, such as the proposed citizenship law 
reform. 
48 Part IV E. 
49 Jeremy Waldron (ed) Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press. Oxford, 1985), 15 . 50 Theories of Rights, above n 49, 15. 
51 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts) 1977) xi . 
52 Dworkin, above n 5 I , 156. 
53 Jeremy Waldron "A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Right ·· ( 1993) 13( I ) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 18, 25. 
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A human right is an interest that each individual shares with every 
other.s4 It possesses a greater value than a legal right value given its universal 
character and the importance of the values that underlie it. It places duties upon a 
State to protect and uphold it through constitutional law. 
The real question is, therefore, whether or not citizenship carries human 
rights status. Such a status would equate to a greater duty being placed on a State 
to recognise, uphold and protect an individual's entitlement to citizenship status. 
This paper will adopt Waldron's approach of identifying the interests at 
stake for the individual who hold citizenship status. Interests that are important 
are those that form a vital aspect of an individual 's well being_ss An assessment 
of such interests and values is essential, according to Dworkin, in order to take 
rights seriously.56 Through this understanding we can determine the character 
and strength of the right. As it is generally accepted that human rights are not 
absolute, the force of a right can only be understood by reference to these 
interests. 57 
The rights-based assessment of citizenship is undertaken in three parts. 
First, this paper examines what individual interests are served by the status of 
citizenship in law, as opposed to non-citizenship status such as a permanent 
resident or "alien" (non-naturalised migrants including refugees). Most of this 
assessment will be based on the New Zealand's legal system but recourse will be 
made to other jurisdictions such as the United States, Australia and the United 
Kingdom to provide helpful comparisons. In particular, recent changes to the use 
of citizenship as a tool to determine right and benefit allocations will be 
discussed. Secondly, other key interests of citizenship to an individual will be 
evaluated. These include the importance identity and international protection that 
are afforded by the citizenship. The values of dignity, liberty and equality, which 
are viewed traditionally as the source of a right and their connection to 
54 Theories of Rights, above n 49, I 5. 
55Right to Private Properry, above n 46, 85. 
56 Dworkin. above n 51, 198. 
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citizenship, will also be addressed. The third part of this assessment 1s an 
evaluation of citizenship in international law. 
B Right and Benefits in La,w 
In 1958 Warren CJ of the United States Supreme Court in Perez v 
Brownwell described "[c]itizenship is a man's basic right for it is nothing less 
than a right to have rights."58 This paper will assess whether or not this 
pronouncement is merely rhetorical or technically accurate in New Zealand. 
In New Zealand, there appears to be very little basis to hold that 
citizenship is a super right. Law makes very little distinction between citizens 
and lawful permanent residents regarding rights entitlements. Moreover, it is 
difficult to differentiate between the rights of citizens and non-citizens in New 
Zealand because the rights are not clearly defined in one statute, rather they are 
contained in a number of statutes and regulations. The focus of Parliament has 
been to use specific legislation to restrict benefits or entitlements for non-citizens 
in certain areas. The following outlines the results of a survey of legislation to 
determine the distinctions made between citizen and non-citizens. 
The key statute to begin any assessment of civil and political rights is the 
Bill of Rights. As discussed above, there are two key distinctions made between 
citizens and non-citizens in the Bill of Rights. Section 12 ensures that citizens 
have a right to vote, and section 18(2) provides citizens have a right to enter New 
Zealand.59 The right to vote is not exclusive to citizens however. Permanent 
residents are also entitled to vote by the Electoral Act, but the articulation in the 
Bill of Rights can be seen as extra protection afforded to the class of people who 
have a specific right to participate politically in government. 60 
Unlike New Zealand citizens, non-citizens do not have the right of entry 
and the security of residence in New Zealand. Non-New Zealand citizens can 
57 Theories of Rights, above n 49, 16. 
58 
( 1958) 356 US 44, 64-65 (SC). 
59 Bill of Rights Act 1990, sl 8(2) . 
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only gain entry by permission. 61 The Immigration Act 1987 provides that every 
New Zealand citizen has the right to enter and remain in New Zealand at anytime 
and is not liable for removal or deportation in any circumstances.62 
Immigration Jaws regulate how permission is granted by the State for 
persons to enter New Zealand and also provide the State with the means to deport 
non-citizens.63 Immigration law is one of the areas of law that is perceived as a 
matter of the State's prerogative in external affairs. 64 The courts will be "slow to 
intervene" in such an area as Cooke J (as he then was) noted in Ashby v Minster 
of Immigration. 65 The Bill of Rights only protects a non-citizen from deportation 
by ensuring that the deportation order is made on grounds prescribed by law.66 A 
non-citizen, therefore, is vulnerable to the vagaries of immigration law in terms 
of being able to stay in or return to New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, once accepted for entry as a permanent resident, non-
citizens such as immigrants and refugees, enjoy a range of substantive citizenship 
rights and benefits. These include: 
• freedom of movement within New Zealand;67 
• the right to vote;68 
• the ability to own property including land and businesses69 (subject to 
restrictions on people who do ordinarily reside in New Zealand and make 
substantial investments in property); 70 
• the ability to take up employment or to establish a business (subject to the 
recognition of some overseas qualifications); 71 
60 Electoral Act 1993, ss 60,73. 
61 Immigration Act ss3, 7( I), 7(3), 14E, 14C(6). 
62 Immigration Act 1987, ss3, 126. 
63 Immigration Act 1987, ss 128, 148. 
6-1 Joseph , above n 15 , 627 . 
65 [ 1981] I NZLR 222 (CA) 226. 
66 Bi II ofRights Act I 990, s 18( 4 ). 
67 Bill of Rights Act I 990, s 18( I) . 
68 Electoral Act 1993. ss 60.73 . 
69 Citizenship Act I 977, s23 . 
70 Overseas Investment Act 1973 . 
71 Restrictions are applied by the relevant trade and profess ional organisations that regulate the 
occupation such as for example the Master Plumbers Association. 
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• the right to access public medical services, social benefits and other social 
services; 72 and 
• the right to education for children. 73 
All non-citizens, including temporary entrants (even illegal entrants) 
enjoy a range of civil and political rights. 74 Whether or not this extends to legal 
equality for aliens is another matter and it is outside the scope of this paper to 
discuss this. 
There are some other distinctions found in other statutes. Only a citizen 
can hold political office either in Parliament or local government.75 This is an 
important aspect of the right to participate in representative government. 
In addition, non-citizens are excluded from being employed in the public 
service in positions that relate to national security such as Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade.76 The Human Rights Act provides an exemption to the 
prohibition of discrimination in employment on the basis of ethnic or national 
origins in relation to work involving national security.77 A non-citizen is able to 
serve on a Board of Trustees for a school provided that he or she is able to reside 
in New Zealand lawfully. 78 Similarly no distinction is made between non-citizens 
and citizens in jury service with voter registration being the key eligibility 
· 79 requirement. 
In summary, it would appear that Warren CJ's characterisation of 
citizenship as a right to have rights does not apply in New Zealand. Other 
western democracies, such as the United States and Australia, also determine 
rights entitlements on the basis of residence as opposed to citizenship status. 
However, there are some important differences to note with regard to the right to 
72 Social Security Act 1964. 
73 Education Act 1964, s3. 
74 Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
75 Electoral Act s4 7 (3 ), Local Electoral Act 200 I s25 . 
76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade web site <hllp://www.mfat.govt.nz/about/careers/ 
career.html> (last accessed 27 September 2004). 
77 Human Rights Act 1993, ss25 , 21 . 
78 Education Act I 989, s I 03. 
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vote and also the movement of governments to exclude non-citizens from 
benefits. 
In Australia, the right to vote in federal elections and most State elections 
is the preserve of citizens.80 Some States allow non-citizens to vote in State 
elections and pre-1984 British immigrants are also permitted to vote. Voting is 
also a duty and those citizens who do not vote are liable to be fined. 81 In United 
States the right to vote is the sole preserve of citizens. 82 
The Constitutions of the United States and Australia do not provide 
guidance in terms of the allocations of rights and benefits. In the United States 
there is a great deal of jurisprudence and academic commentary on this matter. 83 
Prominent American academics such as Bickel84 and Aleinikoff85 have declared 
that citizenship counts for nothing. Aleinikoff declares that "it is primarily 
residence in the Unites States, not citizenship, that affords rights to 
individuals."86 He contends that Warren CJ's characterisaton of citizenship as a 
super right is a "dramatic overstatement of the importance of citizenship in the 
United States today. 87 
Until recently, Bickel's and Aleinikoff's pronouncements would have 
been largely correct in terms of the distinction made in law between citizens and 
non-citizens in the United States. Most rights and benefits are determined on the 
basis of residence in the United States. At the State level, there are few 
distinctions between the substantive rights of citizens and permanent residents.88 
States are able to exclude resident aliens from "political functions", which 
include jury service, voting in State elections and certain public employment 
positions. Federal alienage distinctions were few prior to 1996 and "did not 
79 Juries Act 1981, s6. 
80 Gianni Zappala and Stephen Castles "Citizenship and Immigration in Australia" ( 1999) 13 Geo 
Immig LJ 273, 304. 
81 Zappala, above n 80, 304. 
82 "The Functionality of Citizenship" ( 1997) I I O Harv L Rev 1814, 1820. 83 Maltz, above n 42, 1135. 
84 Cited in Bosniak, above n 39, 1286. 
85 T Alexander Aleinikoff 'Theories of Loss of Citizenship" ( 1986) 84 Mich L Rev 1471, 1486. 86 
Aleinikoff, above n 85, 1486. 
87 
Aleinikoff, above n 85. 1486. 
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impose a major barrier to a meaningful and prosperous life m the United 
States". 89 
1 Recent changes 
With regard to welfare entitlements, both Australia and the United States 
have moved to restrict access by non-citizen residents. This is part of the trend of 
the governments of these countries to revitalize citizenship.90 
The United States Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 199691 which excludes many aliens, including 
permanent residents from numerous social welfare programmes.92 The 1996 Act 
has increased the value of citizenship by creating serious distinctions between 
citizen and non-citizen and is likely to pave the way for more"93 Spiro notes that 
the "resurgent hostility" towards aliens as well as the 1996 Act has led to aliens 
naturalising in record numbers. 94 
This change is likely to be supported by the academics who have argued 
that citizenship should be more meaningful.95 Maltz for instance, has argued that 
citizenship should be accorded greater respect in the United States constitutional 
framework. Based on a detailed analysis of the Constitution and Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the distinctions made between citizens and non-citizens, 
Maltz concluded that such distinctions are permissible:96 
The case for judicial interventions against citizenship-based 
classifications is particularly weak. The text. structure, and history of the 
Constitution reflect a keen appreciation of the importance of the political 
relationships inherent in both State and national citizenship, as well as the 
88 "The Functionality of Citizenship", above n 82, 1820. 
89 "The Functionality of Citizenship'", above n 82, 1820. 90 Schuck, above n 3, 9; Zappala, above n 80, 304. 
91 Pub L No 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat 2105. 
92 "The Functionality of Citizenship", above n 82. l 814. 
93 "The Functionality of Citizenship", above n 82, 1820. 9
~ Peter Spiro ·'Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship'" (1997) 46 Emory LJ 141 l, 
1412. 
95 Bosniak , above n 39. 1285 for summary of these debates: also Schuck. above n 3, 3. 96 Maltz, above n 42, 1190. 
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potential relevance of those relationships to the allocation of a wide 
variety of rights and benefits. 
Australia appears to be following the lead of the United States in this 
regard. Zappala outlines the recent moves in Australia to differentiate more 
sharply between the rights of citizens and non-citizens, such as increasing the 
waiting period for welfare benefits for new entrants, and restrictions on the 
ability to reunify families. 97 
These changes form part of a trend to increase the use citizenship status 
to determine the allocation of rights and benefits.98 Bosniak, an American 
academic, has observed that citizenship has "enjoyed a huge resurgence of 
interest in constitutional Jaw scholarship in recent years" with many academics 
advocating a movement towards recasting the American constitutional rights 
framework in the language.99 
The movement towards "constitutional citizenship" is seen by many to 
entail the loss of non-citizen rights. '00 Bosniak considered the arguments of 
theorists that the revitalization of citizenship need not lead to a loss of non-
citizens rights and concluded that these arguments were "quite plausible, but only 
to a point." 101 As distinctions increase between citizens and non-citizens, the 
non-citizen will become "increasingly marginalised." 102 
In the context of recent world events, such as the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and the "War on Terror", it is like] y that the status of citizenship will 
become of increasing importance. As Mueller observes, in the post September 11 
environment, the optimal point of rights allocation has shifted. 103 Worldwide 
refugee pressures has also added to the dynamics of this situation. Overall, there 
97 Zappala, above n 80, 309. 
98 Schwartz, above n 14, 2143 citing Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith Citizenship Without 
Consel!t: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985). 
99 Bosniak, above n 39, 1286. 
100 Bosniak, above n 39, 1286. 
101 Bosniak, above n 39, 1293. 
102 Bosniak , above n 39, 1294. 
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is an increasing trend to define who is included and excluded from the protection 
of the State. 104 It seems increasingly likely that citizenship will be used a 
condition rights and benefits entitlements from the State. 
In conclusion, there is little distinction between a citizen and non-citizen 
rn law in New Zealand. New Zealand has not followed the United States and 
Australia to use citizenship as a tool of distinction in relation to rights and 
benefits entitlements. However, this paper has shown that non-citizens are 
vulnerable to limitations upon future rights entitlements. As recent changes in the 
United States and Australia have shown it is possible that citizenship status may 
become a tool of distinction in the future. 
2 Importance of residual citizenship rights 
The above discussion has shown that there are some important residual 
rights that are attached to the status of citizenship and the value of such rights 
should not be underestimated. These include citizenship as a means of 
participation and providing a place of residence. 
A citizen has the right to full political participation in his or her State. 
While New Zealand grants this right to permanent residents, only citizens have 
this right recognised and protected in the Bill of Rights. In addition, non-citizens 
cannot stand for political office. Citizenship entitles people to the full rights of 
political participation. As such it increases the value of citizenship status. 
Citizenship, Rubenstein declares, 1s the "essence of a representative 
democracy" 105 Waldron observes that inherent in the concept of a citizen is that 
of a person who can "hold his head high and participate fully and with dignity in 
the life of his society." 106 
103 Dennis Mueller '· Rights and Citizenship in a World of Global Terrorism'· 6th World Congress 
of the International Association of Constitutional Law<http://iaclworldcongress.org/english/ 
program.shtml> (last accessed 14 July 2004) , 12. 
i0-1 Bosniak, above n 39. 1290. 
105 "Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debates·' above n 29, 315. 
106 Jeremy Waldron Liberal Rights. Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993), 308. 
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The concept of citizenship marked our transition from being subjects of 
the sovereign to being people who had an active role in determining political 
decisions. '07 As Grosso, notes, "a citizen is a person who claims and obtains 
rights by somehow participating in political decisions." 108 
Many people may be perfectly content not to exercise their right of 
participation as citizens. However, I consider it difficult to deny that this aspect 
of citizenship is of fundamental value to an individual. At least citizenship 
represents the ability to be able to participate fully in the political life of a State. 
It is also important to recognise that the status of citizenship will 
generally provide security of residence in an individual ' s country. Citizens are 
also afforded the right of entry into New Zealand. Permanent residents have the 
right of re-entry, but as noted above this right is not protected and non-citizens 
are subject to the vagaries of immigration law. It is hard to imagine living 
without a sense of a homeland, without knowing that there was a place that you 
could live without fear of being removed; Edward Said ' s autobiography 
eloquently addressed the sense of dislocation that an individual feel s in such 
situations. 109 
Kymlicka argues that a person has a right to live in his or her community 
in order to be able to exercise his or her liberty: "it is only through a rich and 
secure culture structure that people can become aware in a vivid way of the 
options available to them, and intelligently examine their values" . 11 0 Ideally, the 
location of this place should reflect an individual ' s cultural identity. However 
people often choose to establish themselves in other countries subject to different 
cultures. 
This paper has shown that there are few rights and benefits that are linked 
to the status of citizenship but it has pointed to a trend to use citizenship statu a 
107 Gross, above n 36, 53. 
108 Enrico Grosso " Citizenship and Identity in the Crisis or the Nation State : A European 
Perspective'" 6'h World Congress or the International Association or Constitutional Law 
<hltp://iaclworldcongress.org/english/program.shtml > (last accessed 14 July 2004) 3. 
109 Edward W Said Out of Place (Granta Books, London . 1999). 
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a means of distinction. It has been argued, however, that the residual rights and 
benefits attached to citizenship, including political participation and providing 
security of residence are of great value to an individual. 
C Other Key Interests 
Citizenship can be seen as an essential component of an individual's 
identity. People are the product of the community in which they are brought up, a 
place that shapes their character and conception of themselves. As Aleinikoff 
writes: 111 
Imagine that you awake one morning to find that your American 
citizenship has been taken away. What springs to mind? That travel to 
Europe may be dif!icult without an American passport? That no country 
will seek your release if you become a hostage overseas? That it will be 
impossible for you to vote in the next pres idential election? I doubt that 
any of these issues are on the top of your concern list. More likely, you 
feel violated, naked. You ask, how can I be not an American? What am I 
then? A part of oneself is gone. 
In a homogeneous State, an individual 's cultural identity is reflected in 
his or her citizenship status. Gans argues that an individual's cultural identity is 
the "main focus of identification" because it provides a sense of belonging to a 
· 112 commumty. 
Citizenship is significant in that it provides a means to transcend ethnicity 
and provides a basis for membership of a community. Cicero in De legibus noted 
the ability of citizenship to unite people with different ethnic origins who are 
received into a political community (in other words the people of States defeated 
by Rome) into the membership and identity of a new State. 113 During the French 
Revolution, citizenship was perceived as the collective identity that defined the 
11° Cited in Zilbershats, above n 2, 85. 
111 Aleinikoff, above n 85. 1596. Aleinikoff recognises the importance of citizenship to a 
individual' identity, but he does not see this as a ground for treating citizenship as a right 
112 Cited in Zilbershats, above n 2, 90. 
11 3 Grosso , above n 108, I I . 
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entire political community and alternative identities such as property, the family, 
place of origin or religion were opposed. 114 
Citizenship cannot be the sole factor that contributes to our sense of self. 
Nor can it completely override the importance of the membership to a cultural or 
ethnic group as world history in civil wars has shown. It is difficult therefore, to 
assess the weight or importance that citizenship plays in relation to an 
individual's identity and membership to a community. How can I determine how 
important it is to me to be a New Zealander? It is sufficient to conclude that 
citizenship, is at least one important factor in providing a sense of identity and 
membership to a community. 
An individual who does not possess citizenship is stateless. 115 Since 
stateless individuals do not possess a nationality in international law terms, the 
principle link by which they could derive benefits from international law is 
missing. 11 6 A stateless individual would lack the possibility of diplomatic 
protection or of international claims being presented by one State in respect of 
harm suffered by them at the hands of another State. Without citizenship 
individuals are persona non grata, vulnerable to deportation and once deported, 
are ineligible for the "global protection racket" afforded by the concept of 
nationality in international law. 11 7 
This is another feature of citizenship that adds weight to the argument 
that it is valuable to an individual. Another argument can be made that 
citizenship is a derivative of the right to dignity, equality and liberty. 
Rights theorists derive a human right from key values. These generally 
are based on the premise that individual dignity, equality and liberty are 
fundamental to an individual's wellbeing. For Dworkin, there are two key ideas 
114 Grosso, above n I 08, 6. 
11 5 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law (9ed, Longman 
Group, Harlow, 1992) 886. 
11 6 Jennings, above n 115, 886. 
11 7 Blackman, above n 9, I 150. 
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underlying rights, the "powerful idea of human dignity" and "political 
equality". 11 8 
Much has been written on the source of rights and their justification and it 
is not possible to summarise this field of discourse.' 19 However, it is important to 
consider how the attainment of citizenship (or its denial) can affect these key 
values. 
With regard to the matter of equality, citizenship by its nature marks the 
recognition by the State of an individual ' s status. Limiting the ability of people to 
attain and retain this status will inevitability lead to inequality between people. 
The liberty of an individual is also affected by citizenship status. As a 
non-citizen, a person does not have the same ability to paiticipate in decisions 
affecting him or her, nor does he or she have the right to remain in a State. 
Arguably, a person ' s dignity is also affected if he or she is denied the ability to 
fully participate politically. 
These ai·guments lead, I believe, to the conclusion that citizenship is an 
important value and meaning to an individual. This augurs well for the treatment 
of citizenship as a human right. The following section of the paper forms the 
final part of the rights-based assessment by examining international law to 
determine whether or not any support can be found for citizenship as a human 
right. 
D International Law 
As outlined above, nationality is a term used to denote the effects of the 
individual-State relationship that operate beyond the State. It follows therefore, 
that if an instrument of international law imposed an obligation on a State to 
confer nationality upon an individual, this would be the equivalent of ensuring 
that that person has citizenship. There may be distinctions. A person may be 
11 8 Dworkin, above n 51 , 198-99. 
11 9 "A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights". above n 53 , 21 . 
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considered a national of a State, but not a citizen, if he or she is a permanent 
resident, but this paper shall not address such subtleties. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948 is a good starting point in determining what 
is a human right. 120 The Universal Declaration is the main source of law on 
human rights but it is not a binding treaty. 
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration set out for the first time the 
individual's right to a nationality: "1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 2. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality." However, the vagueness of the Article has robbed it of 
any immediate force. 121 As Blackman explains, the Article does not carry a 
specific corresponding obligation on States to confer nationality. In other words, 
the Article fails to indicate precisely which nationality one has the right to, and 
under what circumstances that right applies. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) failed 
to take the right of nationality forward as a binding treaty obligation. 122 Article 
24(3) limits the right to children only, it declares that "[e]very child has the right 
to acquire a nationality". Article 24(3) protects the right of every child to acquire 
a nationality, but it does not necessarily make it an obligation for States to grant 
nationality to every child born in their territory. Moreover, it does no contain a 
general right to nationality. According to Chan this is one of the "glaring 
omissions of the transposition of the Universal Declaration". 123 
The omission of a general right to nationality is explicable in two ways. 
First a special convention was adopted in 1961 dealing with the Reduction of 
Statelessness. 124 According to Zilbershats, the 1961 Convention made it 
120 UNGA Resolution 2 17 (III) (10 November 1948). 
12 1 Blackman, above n 9, 1172. 
122 Chan, above n 7. 5. 
123 Chan, above n 7, 5. 
124Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (30 August 1961) UNTS 989 175 . 
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unnecessary to restate the right to nationality in the ICCPR. 125 Chan, based on his 
assessment of the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR, concluded that the 
Convention was used as an excuse for not including a general right to a 
nationality. 
The second reason for the omission is that the right to nationality was 
seen to violate State sovereignty. 126 Many States argued that naturalisation could 
not be a right of an individual but was accorded by the State at its discretion. 127 
In the end, the parties to the ICCPR were unable to agree upon a formulation of 
the right to nationality which meet such concerns and the 1961 Convention 
provided a sufficient excuse to avoid this complex area. 
The 1961 Convention focuses on the reduction and elimination of 
statelessness by imposing duties upon contracting States. 128 Its objective is to 
encourage States to create a domestic regime to confer nationality on people 
lawfully within their borders who would otherwise be stateless. Is also seeks to 
prevent the loss or deprivation of citizenship if as a result, the person would 
become stateless. The Convention came into force in l 97 5 and has been ratified 
by 28 States. 129 New Zealand has yet to ratify the Convention but Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has notified an intention to accede to it following the amendment 
of the Citizenship Act 1977 .130 
Support for the recognition of nationality as a human right is found in the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. Article 20 of the Convention 
protects the right to have, to retain and change an individual's nationality and 
goes further than the Universal Declaration by imposing an obligation on the 
Contracting State to grant its nationality to any stateless person born in its 
· 13 1 terntory. 
125 Zilbershats, above n 2, I 0. 
126 Zilbershats, above n 2, I I. 
127 Chan, above n 7. 5. 
128 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, above n 124, art 1,4,5 ,9. 
129 United Nations Treaty Collection< www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4_. htm> (date last 
accessed 22 September 2004 ). 
130 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade <http: www.mfat.govt.nz/support/legal/inttreaties3. 
html> (date last accessed 22 September 2004). 
131 Chan, above n 7, 5. 
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The Inter-American Convention came into effect in 1978 and is the only 
internationally binding instrument that contains a general right to a nationality. 132 
As of August 1997, 25 countries, not including the United States, had ratified the 
Convention.
133 
The American Court of Human Rights, a body established by the 
Inter-American Convention, held in an important advisory opinion that 
nationality is an inherent human right: 134 
It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right of all 
human beings. Not only is nationality the basic requirement for the 
exercise of political rights, it also has an important bearing on the 
individual 's legal capacity. 
Support for the argument of citizenship as a human right is also found in 
the language of the Oppenheim's famous Treatise on International law. In 1905, 
the first edition of the text, Oppenheim declared "it is not for International but for 
Municipal Law to determine who is and who is not be considered a subject". 135 
In the ninth edition the language has changed: 136 
[I]n principle, and subject to any particular international law obligarion 
which might apply, it is not for international law but for the internal law 
of each State to determine who is, and who is not to be considered its 
national. 
The view of commentators on international law appears to be clearly 
behind citizenship, or nationality, emerging as a human right. Based on a survey 
of developments in international law undertaken in 1982, Chan concluded that 
"recognition of an individual's right to nationality as a fundamental human right 
is an inevitable and logical consequence of the current development." 137 
132 
Chan, above n 7, 5. 
133 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights web site< http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm> 
(date last accessed : 22 September 2004). 
13
~ Re Amendments to the Naturali-::,ation Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica (Advisory 
Opinion OC /84) ( 1984) 5 HRLJ 161 para 32. 
13
) Zilbershats. above n 2, 8. 
136 Jennings, above n J 15. 852 (emphasis added). 
137 Chan, above n 7, 1. 
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International law expert, Jeffrey Blackman, reached the same conclusion 
m 1998 from his survey of international law. 138 Blackman is convinced that 
international law is evolving to assign positive obligations on States to confer 
nationality to persons which accords with their genuine link to a State. This 
development, he believes, is formed largely in response to human rights 
principles which have developed over the past fifty years which stress individual 
rights and positive obligations on States in their treatment of people. The right to 
a nationality, the duty to avoid statelessness, and the norm of non-discrimination 
have emerged to present affirmative obligations, or at least presumptions, on 
States in their granting and withdrawal of nationality. 
Henkin is in agreement and urges the recognition of the human right to a 
nationality "[I]t is time for international law to insist on the rationality and equity 
of States laws of citizenship and nationality and provide international protection 
of the human right to a nationality on rational terms." 139 
Overall, however, there is no clear statement from international human 
rights law that citizenship is a human right. Important regional conventions such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 do not provide a general 
right to a nationality. 140 The Convention for the Reduction of Statelessness has 
only be ratified by a small number of States, the Universal Declaration does not 
have binding force and the scope of the right to a nationality under the ICCPR is 
very limited. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that international law 
could come to recognise citizenship, or nationality, as a human right. 
E Overall Assessment 
This paper has shown, that the status of citizenship, at least in the 
jurisdictions referenced in this paper, does generally not form the basis of right 
and benefit entitlements. One should not conclude, however, that this is a world-
wide practice. 
138 Blackman, above n 9, 119 l . 
139 Zilbershats, above n 2, 67 . 
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Although there is little suppo1t for concluding that citizenship is a right to 
have rights, there are some fundamental residual rights that are attached to the 
status of citizenship, which are not shared with non-citizens. The ability for an 
individual to participate fully in the political life of his or her country and to be 
able to return and remain in his or her country represents significant values. 
The rights-based assessment has also shown that citizenship has an 
important value to an individual based identity, membership to a community and 
protection of international law. The acquisition of citizenship arguably affects the 
dignity, liberty and equal treatment of an individual. These are the traditional 
values from which rights are derived. The task of identifying the morally crucial 
interests that require citizenship to be accorded is a conceptually difficult task. 
Many of the statements linking the value of citizenship to the individual have the 
quality of suppositions. My argument is that citizenship is deserving of human 
rights status as it contains important elements relating to the security and well 
being of individuals. 
There is limited scholarship regarding citizenship as a human right other 
than the writings of international law scholars discussed above. Of the academics 
that have considered this subject, opinion is divided as to whether or not 
citizenship has human rights status. 
Gross declares that citizenship is a "basic right" because it is the basis for 
the right to vote in Israel. 141 On the other hand, Bickel, as noted earlier in this 
paper, has rejected a rights-based approach to citizenship. Aleinikoff, m 
agreement with Bickel, has contested the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
citizenship as a right in Afroyim v Rusk. 142 He has argued that it is "inappropriate 
to conceive of citizenship in rights terms" as the Fomteenth Amendment "does 
not speak in right terms" and citizenship is simply a relationship between an 
140 (4 November 1950) UNTS 213. 
141 Gross, above n 36. 63. 
142 Afroyim I' Rusk, above n 41,268. 
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individual and the State. The basis of his argument is that all people residing in 
the United States are afforded the protection of the Constitution. 143 
In my opinion, Aleinikoff has underestimated the value of the residual 
rights that flow from citizenship status. He has also ignored the underlying 
concept of citizenship; that citizenship reflects the strongest bond between and 
individual and the State. There is a good argument that citizenship is more than 
simply a relationship between an individual and the State. Citizenship, 
inherently, conveys a stronger claim to constitutional protections. 
Perhaps Bickel and Aleinikoff, writing from the United States where the 
attainment of citizenship status is protected by the Constitution, could have been 
influenced by their own "comfort zones". Bickel and Aleinikoff work from the 
basis that the criteria determining citizenship attainment and retention are 
protected and they may not have contemplated what it would mean to have 
citizenship treated as a mere legal construct. Where rights are defined and 
protected by a Constitution, the concept of citizenship does not seem to add 
value. Therefore it is easy to dismiss citizenship as a "relationship" lacking in 
any rights value. There is no such luxury in New Zealand, Australia and the 
United Kingdom. 
Bickel and Aleinikoff were writing m the United States pnor to the 
movement towards attaching greater meaning to citizenship status and the 1996 
legislation. Schuck, another American writer, agreed with Bickel in 1989 but in 
1997 he wrote that he had changed his opinion. "Today, however, Bickel's (and 
my) confident assurances seem embarrassingly premature. In a radically altered 
political environment, the question of citizenship is now both salient and 
divisive." 144 
Adding weight to the argument that citizenship should be viewed as a 
human right is the trend in international law to view nationality as a human right. 
It will be interesting to see how this trend is affected by the other trend to 
143 Aleinikoff, above n 85, 1487. 
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increase the meaning of citizenship. States may resile from any obligation to 
ensure that certain people have a nationality as they seek to restrict citizenship 
criteria to those people who have "meaningful and ongoing links" with the 
S 145 Th . f . tate. e nse o terronsm, the effects of the "War on Terror" and refugee 
pressures experienced by many western democracies will increase the 
momentum and strength of the movement to revitalise the meaning of 
citizenship. 
The start of this section of the paper recorded Bickel' s concern regarding 
a rights-based approach to citizenship. Bickel argues that citizenship should, and 
indeed does, have little constitutional meaning in the United States. I share 
Bickel' s concern regarding the potential effects of greater constitutional meaning 
of citizenship. The more meaning we attach to citizenship as a means of 
distinction in rights and benefits allocations, the more likely will be the loss of 
the same for non-citizens. Maximum distinction could equate to minimum 
inclusion. This represents a significant risk in malcing citizenship status more 
meaningful. 
Essentially there are two paths that can be undertaken. The first is to 
eschew any notion of citizenship being important in order to avoid any 
discrimination or movement away from the universalist model of right 
allocations. The second path involves a commitment to citizenship as a human 
right. The second path is the most desirable in the light of the conclusion that 
citizenship is important to an individual. Furthermore, the treatment of 
citizenship as a human right serves as an important safety device to avoid a loss 
of individual rights at a time when rights allocations are being redefined. At the 
very minimum, citizenship as a legal status should require greater protection in 
constitutional frameworks. Much can be learned from the United States 
Constitution in this regard. 
If the second path is followed, it need not lead to the loss of rights and 
benefits for non-citizens provided the focus is on the how citizenship as a human 
144 Shuck, above n 3, I 0. 
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right is acquired and retained. It is not necessary to examine the rights that flow 
from the status of citizenship. Rather the inquiry should be: citizenship, a right 
for whom? This inquiry will direct attention away from the allocation of rights 
and benefits according to citizenship status and instead focus on how citizenship 
status is acquired. There is of course the danger that criteria for citizenship status 
are narrowed as a result of this inquiry. Indeed, this is the approach of the 
proposed law reform as the next section of this paper will address. 
V CITIZENSHIP ON THE AGENDA 
If citizenship is to be regarded as a human right, then it is important to 
examine the content of citizenship law. The right to acquire citizenship status, 
and retain this status, comprises two distinct aspects of the human right to 
citizenship. Chan would include a third aspect to the right of citizenship, that is 
the ability to change an individual's citizenship. 146 Only the first two aspects of 
citizenship will be addressed in this section as the third relates to the process of 
naturalisation. 
This part of the paper will address how law should address the acquisition 
and the attainment of citizenship status. This will involve an assessment of the 
present law and the implications of the Government's Identity (Citizenship and 
Travel Documents) Bill (the Bill). 147 This Bill contains a comprehensive reform 
package that will amend the Citizenship Act 1977 and the Passports Act 1992. 
The proposed reforms contained in the Bill will be placed in the context of 
overseas citizenship law. Finally, this paper will suggest strategies to recognise 
the importance of citizenship and protect an individual's right to citizenship. 
F Acquisition of Citizenship Status 
Citizenship has a role as "an important exclusionary status category." 
148 
Up until recent times, the history of citizenship reflected a progressive 
145 Hon G Hawkins (29 July 2004) 62 NZPD 14496. 
146 Chan. above n 7, 13. 
147 Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill, No I 48-1. 
148 Linda Bosniak ·'Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage'' (2000) 94 Nw UL Rev 9 
963 , 976, 
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incorporation of previously excluded groups. 149 The tide has turned, however, 
and citizenship status is becoming more difficult to acquire. 
According to Price, great empires and humble nations alike have made 
similar choices in determining the criteria for citizenship. 150 There are two main 
methods. The first method is to assign citizenship by place of birth that is within 
the territorial boundaries of a State. This is referred to as the principle }us soli or 
birthright citizenship. The second method is according to the citizen status of at 
least one of the child's parents, in other words, by descent. This is referred to as 
the principle }us sanguinis. Citizenship may also be acquired by grant of the State 
through the naturalisation process and by adoption. 
The Anglo-American tradition is to assign citizenship by }us soli. The 
reason for this lies deep in England's medieval history. In 1608, the case of 
Calvin v Smith (commonly referred to as "Calvin's case") decided the future of 
citizenship law. 151 Lord Coke held that Robert Calvin, born in Scotland after the 
English throne had passed to James IV of Scotland, was not an alien and could be 
considered a subject of England. 152 Therefore, Calvin's case determined that a 
child born within a sovereign's territory is a sovereign's subject, or in modern 
parlance, a "citizen." 153 
In New Zealand, the Citizenship Act 1977 confers citizenship through }us 
soli and }us sanguinis. Section 6 confers citizenship by birth on New Zealand 
territory and section 7 by descent from a parent who has New Zealand 
citizenship by birthright. 
149 "Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage··, above n 148, 980 
150 Polly Price "Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin ·s Case ( 1608)'' ( 1997) 9 Yale 
JL & Human 73, 73. 
151 Calvin v Smith 77 Eng Rep 377 (KB) Coke LJ cited in Price, above n 150. 73. 
152 Michael Houston "Birthright Citizenship in the United Kingdom and the United States" 
(2000) 33 Vand J Transnat'I L 693, 698. 
153 Houston, above n I 52, 699: Only a few exceptions, such a children of diplomats and enemy 
aliens in the Crown's enemy occupied territory, apply to birthright citizenship. 
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1 Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill 
The law change proposed by the Government will limit significantly the 
application of the jus soli principle. Unfortunately, the Bill itself only contains a 
limited number of provisions that address this matter, as the Minister for Internal 
Affairs, the Hon G Hawkins announced his intention to: 154 
introduce a Supplementary Order Paper to the Bill to restrict citizenship 
by birth to children of New Zealand citi::,ens and residents. Currently, 
with few exceptions, people born in New Zealand are New Zealand 
citizens. Some people may come to New Zealand on temporary permits 
solely to give birth, so that their New Zealand-born children are citizens. 
Under current law, those children are entitled to access publicly funded 
services such as health care and education. Restricting citizenship by birth 
will ensure that citizenship and its benefits are limited to those people 
with a genuine and ongoing link to New Zealand. 
However, there is one positive change regarding citizenship eligibility in 
the Bill. Clause 7 of the Bill will amend section 7 of the Citizenship Act 1977 to 
allow a person born outside of New Zealand to be a citizen by descent if the 
person's mother or father was a New Zealand citizen by descent at the time of 
the person's birth and if the person would otherwise be stateless. At present, 
citizenship by descent is not granted if the parents are not citizens by birth in 
New Zealand. 155 
The Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) to the Bill referred to by the 
Minister was later introduced to the House on the 8 September 2004. 156 This 
paper is unable to undertake a full assessment of the content of the SOP given its 
timing but some observations can be made. 
The general effect of the SOP is to introduce the proposed changes as 
described by the Minister above. My initial concern that the Bill's removal of 
automatic citizenship for children born in New Zealand would leave many 
15
.J NZPD, above n 145, 14496 (emphasis added). 
155 Citizenship Act 1997, s7. 
156 Supplementary Order Paper, No 258 (8 September 2004). 
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children stateless has been addressed in the SOP. Both sections 6 and 7 of the 
Citizenship Act 1977 will be amended to ensure that the New Zealand citizenship 
will be conferred to persons who would otherwise be stateless by virtue of these 
sections.
157 
Indeed the Bill will allow New Zealand to fulfill its commitments 
under the Convention of the Reduction of Statele sness. 158 
Nevertheless there are some major concerns with this Bill and the manner 
in which it has been introduced. Firstly, amendments to the Bill as contained in 
the SOP, represent a major law change that has not been subject to full public 
scrutiny and debate in the House. It is not desirable that a SOP introduces such 
significant change as this undermines the democratic process of lawmaking. 
There also appears to have been limited consultation undertaken by the 
Government on the proposed reforms. Hon M Robson MP, a member of the 
Progressive Party which forms part of Government and an opponent of the Bill, 
has criticised the Government for lack of consultation with the public. 159 
There has been some criticism of the Bill. The Office of the Commission 
for Children has made a submissions against the Bill. 160 Groups such as the New 
Zealand Federation of Ethnic Councils, and Catholic agency Caritas Aotearoa 
New Zealand, have also made submission against the Bill. 161 But the Bill has 
failed to generate a great deal of interest from the media, academics and public 
generally. 
The Bill has passed its first reading in the House and has been referred to 
Government Administration Committee for consideration. 162 The report of that 
Committee is due back on 8 November 2004. 
157 SOP, above n 156, cl 6(2)(a). 
158 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, above n 130. 
159 NZPD, above n 145, 14506. 
160 The Children's Commissioner ·'Submission from the Children's Commissioner to the 
Government Administration Committee on the Identity'' 13 September 2004. 
161 "Re fuoees call for status to be considered Citizenship Bill submissions heard", Otago Dail y e 
Times website. <htlp://www.odt.co.nz.> (last accessed 22 September 2004). 
162 NZPD. above n J 45, 14511. 
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It appears that the amendments to the Citizenship Act as introduced by 
the SOP will avoid the occurrence of statelessness, but they will not provide for 
the consideration of an individual's effective nationality. This is another major 
area of concern with the Bill. 
A child born in New Zealand from parents who are not New Zealand 
citizens or permanent residents will acquire the nationality of his or her 
parents. 163 This will occur and regardless of the strength of their ties to that 
country and whether the parents plan to stay in New Zealand or not The effect of 
this change is to create multiple generations of foreigners living in New Zealand. 
This undermines the integration of this group of people in New Zealand society. 
The Commissioner for Children has criticised this change for the uncertainty and 
sense of dislocation it is likely to create among children. 164 The Commissioner 
has argued that aspects of the Bill are inconsistent with the United Nations 
Convention of the Rights of the Child. 165 
Another area of concern is the lack of justification and explanation of 
such a significant area of law. The Minister has described the need for the Bill in 
general terms such as national security concerns and the need to ensure that 
people who receive the benefits of New Zealand "genuine and ongoing link to 
New Zealand" 166 
The amendment of section 6 of the Citizenship Act 1977 to restrict the 
application of the jus soli principle appears to be a reaction to the incidence of 
citizenship tourists. 167 Citizenship tourists are pregnant, foreign women who 
come to New Zealand to give birth in order for their children to gain New 
Zealand citizenship. 168 But the Minister was unable to provide any information to 
demonstrate that there is a problem to be addressed. 169 The explanation for the 
163 SOP, above n I 56, cl 6. 
l6-1 The Children 's Commissioner, above n 160. para 4 .5. 
165 The Children ' s Commissioner, above n I 60, para 5.1 . 
166 NZPD, above n 145, 14496. 
167 "Citizenship law change bowing to Australi a' ' ( I September 2004) The Dominion Post, 
Wellington, A6. 
168 Citizenship Act 1977, s6. 
169 Interview with Hon G Hawkins, Minister of Internal Affair (Geoff Robertson, Morning 
Report, 31 August 2004). 
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proposed change to birthright citizenship has been insufficient as S Kedgley MP 
argued in the House: 170 
This automatic right of citizenship is a longstanding right ... we should 
only take away that right if we have good reason, and none has been 
provided yet. Some women are coming here, we are told , to exploit free 
maternity services, but that avenue has been blocked off. One or two 
other women have visited here to give birth, with them paying the cost, in 
order to give their babies New Zealand citizenship, but that does not 
amount to a problem that would cause us to change our law. 
Perhaps there is another explanation for the change that the Government 
is less willing to provide. Some have accused the Government of bowing to the 
pressure of the Australian Government to follow its lead in pushing through law 
with an exclusionary focus. 171 Whatever the reason, this Bill has made a radical 
change to how citizenship status is acquired in New Zealand. The need for this 
change has not been fully justified and its likely effects do not bode well for New 
Zealand's society. 
2 Overseas comparisons 
The American method of conferring citizenship is built on the foundation 
of English common law. The United States Constitution bestows citizenship 
upon anyone born within the territory of United States: "I.All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." 172 
Naturalisation and the application of the )us sanguinis principle to recogmse 
children of citizens born abroad, are also important means of acquiring 
· . h" 173 c1t1zens 1p status. 
It has been presumed that the Constitution requires that all persons born 
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, including children of illegal 
170 (NZPD), above n 145, 14503. 
17 1 "Citizenship law change bowing to Australia" , above n 167. 
172 United States Constitution, amendment XIV§ I . 
173 Price, above n 150, 73. 
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aliens, be granted citizenship. Houston has assessed this presumption in light of 
the calls by many to reinterpret the Constitution to exclude children of illegal 
aliens from citizenship birthright entitlement. 174 The arguments for a 
reinterpretation include the bare fact that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not contemplate the phenomenon of illegal immigrants and that 
the Supreme Court has not clearly stated that such a move would be 
unconstitutional. 175 Houston' s assessment is that these arguments are weak. 
While the case law is not conclusive, it leans towards recognising children born 
to illegal immigrants as citizens. He concludes that recent "Congressional 
attempts to abandon the Fourteenth Amendment territorial birthright citizenship 
are unconstitutional." 176 This conclusion appears to be the stance of most 
academics. 177 
The United Kingdom however, has abandoned the principle of )us soli in 
favour of parentage based citizenship. This change was brought about by the 
British Nationality Act of 1981 in response to the perceived problem of increased 
social service costs due to immigration. 178 
Australia has followed suit to restrict birthright citizenship. Prior to 1986, 
Australia ' s 1948 Citizenship Act assigned citizenship on the basis of birth in 
Australia or through descent. 179 Restrictions were made to the territorial 
birthright citizenship so that a person born in Australia will be an Australian 
citizen only if one of his or her parents was at the time of his or her birth an 
Australian citizen or a permanent resident. Children failing to meet that category 
are provided citizenship status if they have been ordinarily resident in Australia 
for a ten year period from the time of their birth.180 According to Zappala, the 
decision to limit the jus so/i principle was based on the desire of Government to 
174 Houston, above n 152, 696. 
175 Houston, above n 152, 722. 
176 Houston, above n 152, 738. 
177 See generally John W Guendelsberger "Access to Citizenship for Children Born within the 
State to Foreign Parents" ( 1992) 40 Am J Comp La w 379, 380. 
178 Houston , above n 152, 696 
179 "Citizenship and the Constitutional Convention Debate " , above n 29, 308. 
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limit any protection from deportation available to the children of illegal 
· · 181 1mm1grants. 
This year, Irish voters overwhelmingly backed a proposal to tighten their 
citizenship laws. Almost 80 per cent of voters in a referendum were in favour of 
ending the automatic citizenship right for all children born in Ireland. 182 
Price makes an interesting observation that points to the main reason for 
these changes: 183 
In 1608, the rule of obedience and allegiance required of a subject at 
birth was a self-serving policy for a monarchy at a time when few other 
compulsions existed. The cost of a rule determining that all persons 
born within the King's territories were subjects was low because few 
benefits were tied to that allegiance. Today, by contrast, most nations, 
including particularly the United States, have radically expanded the 
benefits tied to the status of citizen. 
This comment leads us to consider what the policy justifications are for 
the retention of the jus soli principle. 
3 Value of Birthright Citizenship 
Debate on citizenship criteria focuses on the question of how inclusive or 
exclusive the criteria should be. Exclusive criteria will restrict the application of 
the birthright citizenship,jus soli, by placing a greater emphasis on citizenship by 
descent, jus sanguinis. The balance between these principles, in combination 
with the immigration and nationalisation laws of a State, forms the basis of 
citizenship criteria. 
There are two main views regarding jus soli. One is that it is a "rule of 
convenience who e moral relevance is limited to a paternalistic past".
184 
It is 
viewed as a constraint on the freedom of governments and individuals. The other 
181 Zappala, above n 80, 284. 
182 Ange lique Chrisafis ·'Has Ireland Lost its Soul ?" (2 July 2004) Guardian Weekly. Sydney, 17. 
183 Price, above n 150. 146. 
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view is that it is a "powerful notion", 185 that there is "something basic about the 
right to be a citizen in the country of an individual's birth" 186 Walzer has even 
gone so far as to say that )us soli is the only protection an individual has against 
State tyranny. 187 
Schuck and Smith 's text, Citizenship Without Consent, proposed to 
replace territorial birthright citizenship with "American-born conditional 
citizenship".
188 
This proposal involves replacing the customary division of 
citizenship Jaws into jus soli or jus sanguinis with the principle of consent. Under 
their proposal, citizenship would be conditional until the age of majority, and 
then citizenship would be acquired through passive acceptance, but that one 
could voluntarily renounce by expatriation. 189 Schuck and Smith argue that this 
proposal is necessary for the community to protect its interests, maintain 
harmony and achieve a unifying sense of shared values. 190 
Schuck and Smith's proposal has received a great deal of criticism from 
many scholars. Many have attacked it as against the intention of the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to create "a hereditary class of voteless denizens, 
vulnerable to expulsion and exploitation"
191 Others have argued that it would 
lead to a return of pre Dred Scott days and would undermine the values of 
d l 
. A . . 19.., 
acceptance an to erance m mencan society. -
The above discussion serves to make the point that an individual 's view 
of citizenship criteria is determined by what values of society are considered 
important. Guendelsberger in his assessment of American and French citizenship 
laws describes United States birthright citizenship as reflecting American 
18-1 Peter H Schuck and Rogers M Smith Citi::,enship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the 
American Po/it)• cited in Schwartz, above n 14, 2170. 
185 Schwartz, above n 14. 2144. 
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society's acceptance of cultural pluralism. 193 In France, birthright citizenship is 
only acquired if there is a link to at least one other connecting factor (descent) in 
addition to mere birth in order to ensure cultural attachment to France. According 
to Guendelsberger, this reflects the importance placed on cultural assimilation 
and filiation in France. 194 
Immigration policy is inextricably linked to this debate and it is worth 
noting that the Bill provides for the tightening of naturalisation requirements for 
immigrants.
195 It increases the required period of residence in New Zealand 
before a migrant can apply for New Zealand citizenship. The "good character" 
requirements that immigrants must satisfy have been stated more explicitly and 
are more strenuous. 196 These changes in combination with the proposed 
tightening of citizenship criteria mark the transition to a more exclusionary focus 
of who may become New Zealand citizens. 
It important that New Zealanders take a hard look at the direction of 
citizenship policy. New Zealanders need to decide whether they want to promote 
an inclusive model of citizenship criteria that reflects our acceptance of a 
pluralistic society and encourages the tolerance of other cultures, or whether the 
French model of cultural assimilation is preferred. 
There are strong justifications for the continued application of the )us soli 
principle in conferring citizenship status in New Zealand. The application of this 
principle avoids the situation whereby a person born in New Zealand acquires the 
citizenship of a country that they have no effective link to or no intention to 
reside in. If a person born in New Zealand has no tie to New Zealand, it is 
unlikely that the conferral of citizenship will impose any great burden on the 
State, as that person is likely to leave New Zealand in any course. But to deny 
citizenship to people who intend to make New Zealand their home on the basis of 
the immigration status of his or her parents' undermines that person's right to 
citizenship. The use of the principle of )us soli in the conferral of citizenship 
193 Guendelsberger, above n 177,428. 
19
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recognises the importance of citizenship to an individual, and accords with the 
treatment of citizenship as a human right. 
G Deprivation of Citizenship 
In New Zealand, citizenship status can be deprived by the Minister in the 
case of fraud during the naturalisation process or on the acquisition of other 
citizenship combined with an action that is "contrary to the interests of New 
Zealand. 197 In addition, an individual is able to voluntarily renounce his or her 
citizenship. 198 
There is very limited case law in New Zealand on the use of the 
Minister's power to deprive a person of his or her citizenship ( or "denationalise" 
a person). Those cases that address this matter only relate to the deprivation of 
New Zealand citizenship on the basis of fraud during the naturalisation 
process. 199 Section 16, which allows the Minister to deprive a person of New 
Zealand citizenship if he or she has acquired the nationality of another country 
and has acted "contrary to the interests" of New Zealand, has not been applied by 
the Courts. 
1 Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill 
One of the conditions for deprivation under section 16 is that the person 
must have acquired the citizenship of another country by a formal act "other than 
marriage". Clause 11 of the Bill amends section 16 remove the words "other than 
marriage". The effect of this change is to remove a restriction and provide 
broader application of the section. No explanation in the Bill has been provided 
for the amendment. 
It is difficult to determine the effect of such a change when the courts 
have not applied this provision .. At face value, it would appear to provide the 
196 Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill No 148- l, cl 9. 
197 Citizenship Act 1977, ssl6 and 17. 
198 Citizenship Act 1977, ss 15. 
199 See generally Wang 1• Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 18. 
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Minister greater scope to deprive a person of his of her citizenship by removing a 
group of people who previously did not come within the ambit of section 16. It is 
unclear as to whether a person can be deprived of his or her citizenship if he or 
she was a national of another country, had later become a naturalised New 
Zealand citizen and had then acted in a manner "contrary to the interests of New 
Zealand." This result would seem to strain the interpretation of section 16. 
Therefore, the effect of the change introduced by the Bill does not appear to be 
significant. 
Despite media reports that the Government was ready to introduce new 
provisions to allow the Minister of Internal Affairs to deprive a person of their 
New Zealand citizenship on national security concerns, this has not formed part 
of the Bill or the SOP. Requests under the Official Information Act 1982 to 
obtain information on this matter were unsuccessfuJ.200 Perhaps as an alternative 
to depriving a person of his or her citizenship, the Government has focussed on 
amending the Passports Act 1992 to provide additional control mechanisms for 
the issuing and use of passports.20 1 
It is unclear if the Government plans future reform in this area. 
Nevertheless, if citizenship is to be treated as a human right, it is important to 
consider under what circumstances, if any, an individual could be deprived of his 
or her citizenship ( or "denationalised"). The matter of fraud in the naturalisation 
process will not be addressed as it is considered justified action on the part of the 
State to revoke citizenship that has been obtained by acts of dishonesty. 
By treating citizenship as a human right, it does not necessarily mean that 
citizenship cannot be revoked; it just ensures that revocation is carried out in a 
certain way, placing the onus on the government to justify the need for 
deprivation and ensure appropriate checks and balances. 
It is not contrary to international law to deprive a person of his or her 
nationality provided that they will not be made stateless in the process and that it 
200 Hon G Hawkins, Min ter of Internal Affairs, (29 May 2004) letter. 
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1s not undertaken in an arbitrary manner. 202 The emergmg norm against 
statelessness means that only people who possess citizenship status elsewhere 
can be denationalised. Article 8 of the Convention of the Reduction of 
Statelessness provides that a contracting State "shall not deprive a person of his 
nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless." Moreover, before 
deporting a person who has been denationalised the State is required to find a 
State that will accept that person.203 
2 Overseas comparisons 
The laws of various States recognise numerous grounds for depriving a 
person of his or her nationality. These grounds generally include acts of treason, 
acquisition of another nationality, prolonged residence abroad and service in 
another State's armed forces without permission. 204 There are two extremes in 
approaches employed: the United States which generally does not permit 
deprivation of citizenship even when that individual would not be rendered 
stateless, and the United Kingdom and Israel which allow the government to 
revoke the citizenship for acts of disloyalty provided they have citizenship in 
another country. 
In the United States, there is a "virtual prohibition on government power 
to terminate citizenship unilaterally."205 Citizenship can only be terminated when 
a person has voluntarily demonstrated his or her intent to relinquish American 
citizenship. The Supreme Court decisions since 1960s have "severely restricted 
the Government' s power to denationalise for reasons of disloyalty or divided 
11 · ,,?06 a egiance. -
In order for the Federal Government to deprive an individual of American 
citizenship it must prove that the individual intended to renounce his or her 
citizenship. This "standard is difficult to satisfy and "few "denationalisations" 
20 1 Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill No 148-1, cl 23. 
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have occurred in the United States. 207 In the case of John Walker Lindh, the so-
called "American Taleban," the Government did not pursue the option of 
revoking his citizenship despite the fact he was alleged to have supported an 
enemy of the United States.208 
In Israel, citizenship of an individual can be revoked at the discretion of 
the Minister for the Interior following an act of disloyalty.209 This provision in 
the Nationality Law has been used twice: to revoke citizenship of a person who 
was involved in the planning of suicide attacks and another person living in 
Lebanon who was linked to the Hizbullah.21 0 Denationalisation was considered 
in relation to the assassin of Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin but the Minister refused 
on the ground that there were no public order issues at stake. 211 The exercise of 
the Minster's discretion is subject to judicial review but so far no review has 
? )? 
been undertaken.- -
In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State recently used the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to revoke the citizenship of Abu 
Hamza.
213 Hamza, a Muslim cleric, was a naturalised British citizen for 20 years. 
His citizenship was deprived under section 40(2) of the Act, which states: 
[t]he Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of that citizenship 
status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the person has done 
anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of (a) the United 
Kingdom or (b) a British overseas territory. 
Hamza has appealed against the order and presently awaits trial. 2 14 
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Statecentric System" (2003) 39 Cal WL Rev 263, 266. 
209 Gross, above n 36 64. 
210 Gross. above n 36, 64. 
211 Gross. above n 36, 66. 
212 Personal communication with Professor Gross, Faculty of Law. Haifa University (5 July 
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2 13 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK); "Cleric Stripped of Citizenship" 
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Justice" (29 May 2004) The Dominion Post. Wellington, BI. 
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3 Future changes 
In the case of Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, Hammond J in 
considering the test under section 17 for deprivation of citizenship, held that the 
Minister must prove the ultimate burden for his or her decision as this is 
"consistent with the view taken under international law today: the loss of 
citizenship, as the right to have rights, is not to be supported, save in very clear 
cases."
215 
I agree with Hammond J but would go further and suggest that the 
approach of the United States Supreme Court should be adopted to avoid the 
discrimination that will apply to people with dual citizenship as this paper will 
explain. 
The mam reasons given for denationalisation include divided or 
transferred allegiance to the State (lack of loyalty) , punishment, public order and 
safety.
216 
Academics generally appear to support in theory the ability of the State 
to revoke an individual ' s citizenship. Gross finds theoretical justification in 
communitarian and social contract theory for the ability of the State to deprive a 
person who has committed an act of extreme disloyalty, such as terrorism. His 
view is that loyalty circumscribes the right to citizenship; once a person has 
broken the bond of loyalty, the State is entitled to "disown" that person. 217 
Other academics such as Spectar and Aleinikoff are in agreement with 
Gross. 21 8 Aleinikoff argues that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not establish irrevocable right to citizenship and the lack of importance of the 
interests does not militate for such a right. 219 While Aleinikoff recognises that 
denationalisation threatens the security of an individual's place of residence, he 
makes light of this matter by arguing that the effect on the individual is limited: 
denationalisation on the basis of disloyalty cannot impair an individual' s sense of 
identity because they have already transferred their allegiance away from the 
State. Deported aliens (denationalised persons) are entitled to the rights that the 
215 Yan v Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 16, 22 
216 Aleinikoff, above n 85 , 1473. 
217 Gross, above n 36, 57 . 
218 Spectar, above n 208, 280. 
219 Aleinikoff, above n 85, 1478. 
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receiving country extends to them, and statelessness will not occur as 
denationalisation grounds require acquisition or existence of citizenship 
elsewhere. 
However, AJeinikoff urges the need for caution in the denationalisation 
process. An overt act of disloyalty is required before the Courts revoke an 
individual's citizenship.220 Gross also urges the need for caution. While he does 
not place a strong requirement on the need for an overt act of disloyalty (Gross 
appears to suggest that membership to a terrorist organisation is sufficient), he 
argues that denationalisation is a criminal sanction, and as such, it should only be 
undertaken by the courts.22 1 Gross is very critical of the current approach m 
Israel whereby denationalisation is undertaken at the Minster's discretion. 
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Cou11 in Trap v Dulles 
provides a strong counter argument. 222 The majority of the Court held that there 
were no grounds to deprive the petitioner who has deserted the army in war time 
of his American citizenship.223 The main reasons given by the Court was that 
American citizenship too precious (the right to have rights argument) and that 
citizenship was "not a licence that expires on misbehaviour."224 The Court also 
held that denationalisation constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" and was 
barred by the Eight Amendment of the Constitution. 225 The factors highlighted 
by the Court were that denationalisation was severe and excessive in that it 
destroyed a person's status nationally and internationally and it is likely to have a 
severe impact on third parties. 226 As a punishment, it infringed on human dignity 
and liberty and that it did not achieve the objective of penal laws to promote 
rehabilitation and deterrence. 227 LastJ y, the Court considered that 
denationalisation may be counterproductive as it would not actually protect 
220 Aleinikoff, above n 85 , 1500. 
221 Gross, above n 36, 121 . 
222 
( 1958) 356 US 86 (SC). 
223 Trop v Dulles, above n 222, 92 Warren CJ Judgment for the majority. 
224 Trop v Dulles, above n 222, 92 Warren CJ. 
225 Trop v Dulles, above n 222, I 02 Warren CJ. 
226 Trop v Dulles, abo\l n 222, I lO Brennan J concurring. 
227 Trop v Dulles, above n 222, I 00 Warren CJ. 
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public safety as the person concerned could continue their actions against the 
State from abroad. 228 
Although there is some justification to permit the deprivation of 
citizenship for someone who has demonstrated extreme disloyalty to the State, 
denationalisation would appear to create more problems than it solves. Surely if a 
person's actions were so heinous to warrant banishment they would have 
infringed the criminal code of the State and they can be dealt with through the 
criminal law process? 
In Israel and the United Kingdom a person may be deprived of his or her 
citizenship for activities that would not be considered crimes. Hamza for instance 
has not been convicted of any crime, but he is considered a threat because of his 
extreme stance against the British Government's position on the war in Iraq.229 
Indeed, Aleinikoff notes the chilling effect that denationalisation based on 
government investigations into the loyalty of its citizens could have on speech 
and conduct. He is only prepared to permit denationalisation based on an actual 
act of extreme disloyalty.230 
Also, it is important to remember that denationalisation is permitted in 
international law only for persons who have another nationality. 231 Will this 
mean that naturalised citizens will have a lesser right of freedoms of expression 
and association? Any move in this direction is likely to create a class of people 
who are less able to exercise their freedoms and rights. Surely once a person has 
become a citizen, his or her citizenship status is equal to that of everyone else? 
A State may not always act on sound information regarding the 
nationality status of the disloyal citizen, or it may simply disregard international 
law. For example, Hamza has argued that he is no longer a citizen of Egypt but 
this has not stopped the Secretary of State issuing an order under to deprive him 
228 Trap v Dulles, above n 222, 11 I Brennan J concurring. 
229 "Cleric Stripped of Citizenship"', above n 213. 
230 Aleinikoff, above n 85 , 1500. 
23 1 Zilbershats, above n 2, 25. 
- 51 -
of his British citizenship.
232 
This matter has yet to be addressed by the British 
courts. 
Denationalisation achieves little except for the short-lived satisfaction of 
the Government in banning a disobedient citizen. It is better to use criminal law 
to address activities that are considered disloyal or affect public order and safety. 
If a person were subjected to these processes it would be difficult to justify the 
deprivation of their citizenship over and above the punishment they have 
received by criminal law. Any move to increase the scope of the Government's 
power to deprive a person of his or her citizenship should be rejected. Such a 
move would not be in accordance with citizenship status as a human right. 
The United States Supreme Court's approach to denationalisation in Trap 
arguably reflects the status of citizenship as a human right as it explains the 
asymmetrical bond between the citizen and the State: citizenship must be granted 
by the State if the person is eligible through territorial birthright or descent, and 
that this status can only be voluntarily revoked by the individual. 
In New Zealand, the constitutional framework does not provide for such 
an asymmetrical relationship between State and the individual. This leads to the 
question of what changes should be made to New Zealand law. In my view, 
citizenship is so important to an individual that New Zealand law should not 
provide for the deprivation of citizenship except in cases of dishonesty during the 
naturalisation process. 
H Constitutional Reform 
Acquisition of citizenship status protects and facilitates some important 
individual rights. This paper has identified that the ability to acquire and retain 
citizenship status comprise essential components of the right to citizenship. 
These components of citizenship should be protected within New Zealand's 
constitutional framework if citizenship is to be accorded human rights status. 
However, as the Bill has demonstrated, the Government is able to make radical 
232 ··cleric Stripped of Citizenship", above n 229 . 
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changes to citizenship law through ordinary statutory amendment processes. 
Governments should not be able to change these criteria without significant 
consultation and support in the community. 
An option for the protection of citizenship could involve amending the 
Bill of Rights. For example, the Bill of Rights could contain the right to acquire 
and retain citizenship. Another option is that the Government be left the power to 
determine the eligibility for citizenship but the right to retain citizenship status 
could be protected. 
Another option is the entrenchment of the relevant sections m the 
Citizenship Act 1977. These sections provide for the acquisition of New Zealand 
citizenship and the limited circumstances, under the present law, when the 
Government can deprive an individual of their citizenship. 
These options cannot be properly addressed within the scope of this paper 
as it forms another topic in itself. There is a great deal of scholarly debate 
regarding whether or not human rights should be constitutionally protected. 
These arguments need to be addressed. 233 
A salient feature underlying this whole discussion has been the difference 
the United States Constitution has made in terms of ensuring that the 
Government cannot change citizenship eligibility and deprive a person of their 
citizenship. Other countries, including New Zealand, have much to learn from 
the United States in this regard. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Up until recently, the question of citizenship has been uneventful in New 
Zealand. The Identity (Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill has the potential 
to chan ere this situation because it introduced some far reaching changes to 0 
citizenship law. This paper has argued that the changes introduced by the Bill , 
233 "A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Right s··. above n 53, 50. 
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particularly in terms of the removal of the )us soli principle for determining 
eligibility for New Zealand citizenship, are not welcome. 
The introduction of radical changes through a SOP and the failure of the 
Government to provide a credible explanation for these changes is undesirable. 
Seen in combination with other proposed changes in the Bill which relate to the 
tightening of the naturalisation process, the reform has a clear exclusionary 
flavour. This does not bode well for the wellbeing of New Zealand society. 
Moreover, the Bill does not treat citizenship in a manner that recognises it as 
something that is of great value to an individual. 
This paper has argued that citizenship is a human right. It may not be 
accurate to characterise citizenship as a right to have rights given the limited 
rights and benefits which flow from this status, but citizenship does, however, 
contain some important residual rights for an individual such as political 
participation and security of residence. Citizenship also facilitates and protects 
some other key interests for an individual including identity and membership to a 
community and status in international Jaw. Without citizenship status a person's 
right to equality, dignity and liberty is precarious. 
It is important that attention 1s directed to an inquiry of how the 
components of the right of citizenship, that is the ability to acquire and retain 
citizenship status, are treated in law. At present, citizenship law provides for 
inclusive notions of citizenship based on the principle of )us so/i. The proposal 
contained in the Bill will restrict who can become a New Zealand citizen. 
Thankfully, the Bill did not introduce any significant changes to allow a 
government to deprive an individual of his or her citizenship despite statements 
early this year to the contrary. This paper has argued that any such change would 
be a retrogressive step. 
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